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INTRODUCTION

As the United States trade deficit has spiralled to record
heights, a great deal of attention has focused on the desirability
of employing import sanctions to eliminate this trade imbalance.
In recent years, United States policy-makers largely have welcomed periodic modification of free trade principles through "fair
trade" restrictions. Now many lawyers, legislators, and economists appear prepared to jettison the entire free trade foundation
of United States policy and resort to government allocation of
market share through quotas, import surcharges, and related
mechanisms.
Opponents of free trade consider it a dangerous relic of the laissez faire era, unsuited for today's neo-mercantilist world of indusThe author is an associate in the Washington office of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison.
*
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trial policy and widespread government economic intervention.
They regard retaliation against subsidized foreign competition
and dumped imports as a fair, and not protectionist, response.
Most of the voting public appear to agree.
However, this "fairness" approach to international trade oversimplifies and distorts several complex issues and concerns. As an
inherently subjective and partisan concept, "fairness" provides an
inadequate basis for designing trade policy. Often superficially
"fair" solutions to particular trade problems actually result in unfair and economically unjustifiable discrimination against foreign
exporters and their customers.
This article utilizes economic analysis to critique fair trade
rhetoric and expose the inconsistencies and protectionist consequences of United States antidumping and antisubsidy laws. Proposed reforms deemphasize the ambiguous concept of fair trade,
and focus instead on balancing the conflicting economic interests
at issue in most trade disputes. Between the elusive, impractical
ideal of unfettered free trade and the protectionist objective of
strict "fair trade" sanctions, lies a principled middle ground toward which trade policy-makers should.be urged to gravitate.
II. DEFINING FAIR TRADE
Passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 19791 marked the culmination of a trend away from discretionary decision-making and
toward adjudicatory resolution of trade disputes. The Act
promulgated strict timetables for dumping and subsidy investigations by the Commerce Department and the International Trade
Commission (ITC), and increased both the scope and accessability of fair trade remedies. 2 A proliferation of fair trade investigations has resulted, significantly influencing the pattern of imports into the United States.
The Commerce Department is responsible for determining particular instances of dumping, defined as less than fair value sales,3
or subsidization, the bestowal of direct or indirect grants for the

1. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered sections df 19
U.S.C. (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Trade Agreements Act of 1979].
2. See generally Symposium: A Practitioner'sGuide to InternationalTrade
Law, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Cohi. REG. 307 (1981) (an extended analysis of United
States antisubsidy and antidumping law).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
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production or exportation of goods.4 If the ITC concurrently finds
that the alleged dumping or subsidization has caused material injury to a domestic industry, the Commerce Department will direct Customs to impose offsetting antidumping or countervailing
duties. 5 Interested parties can appeal unfavorable Commerce Department and ITC decisions to the United States Court of International Trade.6
The adjudicatory process entails a series of complex determinations concerning the various constituent elements of fair trade
complaints. Protectionist initiatives aimed at increasing the scope
and availability of fair trade remedies threaten further to complicate this process. Prior to refining the questionable techniques
utilized in trade deliberations, policymakers should first reexamine the flawed motivating rationale that underlies the entire adjudicatory structure.
The fairness arguments forwarded by domestic industries in
pursuit of import relief appear compelling at first glance. They
justify the levy of countervailing duties as necessary to eliminate
the unfair or artificial price advantage that subsidies confer on
foreign exporters. With equal vigor, they advocate the levy of antidumping duties to eliminate the unfair price discrimination that
occurs when foreign monopolists utilize exorbitant home market
profits to undercut United States competitors.
The theory of fair trade underlying these arguments for retaliatory duties can be summarized as follows: any competitive edge is
unfair if it would not exist absent foreign market distortions or
foreign government policies favoring particular industries. Advocates of fair trade claim to favor open competition but only after
the marketplace is reduced to a level playing field, purged of distortions created by unfair advantages. However, both the attainability and desirability of "fair" market conditions appear
questionable.

III. EVALUATING THE FAIRNESS OF SUBSIDIES
The Trade Agreements Act provided the Commerce Department with a detailed but not exclusive list of foreign government
programs subject to countervailing duties.7 The list incorporates
4. Id. § 1303(a).

5. Id. §§ 1671e(a), 1673e(a).
6. Id. § 1516a.
7. Id. § 1677(5).
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all export subsidies described in the GATT Subsidies Code," as
well as certain domestic subsidies, such as government provision
of goods, services or capital at preferential rates, or government
grants to cover operating losses.
In determining which government actions constitute
countervailable subsidization, Commerce has drawn a fundamental distinction between generally available and more narrowly focused benefit programs. Commerce will countervail any foreign
government program which preferentially benefits specific industries or regions." For example, Commerce countervailed a Belgian
program that reimbursed firms for worker training costs in distressed industrial areas because of the program's regional nature. 10 Other government actions regarded as subsidies include
equity infusions inconsistent with commercial considerations,11
targeted research and development funding, 2 exemptions from
property taxes,13 and exemptions from customs duties on imported equipment. 4
Commerce not only countervails a wide variety of foreign government programs, it also refuses to consider certain offsetting
costs when calculating net subsidies. While Commerce does subtract application fees and offsetting export taxes from the value
of a gross subsidy, it makes no allowance for the indirect or associated costs which exporters must incur before obtaining particular subsidies.15
This brief overview of the United States countervailing duty

8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Interpretation and Application
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, done April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 530, T.I.A.S.
No. 9619, at 13, U.N.T.S. Registration No. 814 LXXXVI (registered July 1,
1980) [hereinafter cited as the Subsidies Code]. Although too lengthy to reprint,
the illustrative list of export subsidies provided in Annex A of the Subsidies
Code includes government programs such as (1) currency retention schemes conferring a bonus on exporters, (2) the provision of government services to exporters at discount rates, (3) the exemption or deferral of direct taxes on exports, (4)
the allowance of special tax deductions for exporters, and (5) the provision of
discount export credits.
9. See Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304 (1982).
10. Id. at 39,305.
11. Id. at 39,304.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Certain Carbon Steel Products from Brazil, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,988
(1984).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (1982).

19851

U.S. FAIR TRADE POLICY

law suffices to illustrate its underlying premise-that a particular
foreign government program can be viewed in isolation as bestowing an unfair competitive advantage. But this premise is erroneous. An individual government program does not operate in a vacuum. Failing to distinguish between individual subsidies and net
rates of subsidization can grossly exaggerate the ultimate impact
of a particular government program on import price. For example, a Brazilian steel manufacturer that receives a subsidy for
relocating to the Amazon region also will incur higher transportation and labor training costs. But Commerce assesses countervailing duties without regard to governmental measures or natural conditions which might offset the financial advantage
conferred by a subsidy. Thus, trade "fairness" is achieved by ignoring the actual, or net, competitive advantage that foreign government subsidies provide importers.
Governments often use subsidies to correct, rather than create,
economic distortions. Subsidies can promote allocative efficiency
if they either offset the effects of counter-productive government
regulations or compensate for externalities. Many of America's
trading partners impose a relatively heavy regulatory burden on
their economies. Particularly in lesser developed countries
(LDCs), misguided government regulations can significantly diminish an industry's natural competitive advantages.10 When government action alters the incentive structure generated by the
private marketplace, pernicious economic distortions often result.
Mexican minimum wage laws, for example, disadvantage laborintensive industries by artificially inflating the cost of their primary input above the market rate. Usually such wage-boosting
measures have the unintended consequence of increasing unemployment and decreasing output in the affected industries.Y The
most efficient means of correcting the ensuing misallocation of resources would be to eliminate the minimum wage. Governments,
however, often view policies such as minimum wages, interest rate
ceilings and price controls as politically sacrosanct because of

16.

See P. BAUER,

REALITY AND

RirORmc, 33-35 (1984). In this and prior

works, Professor Bauer has sought to demonstrate the destructive impact widespread government intervention has had in the economies of many developing
nations.
17. For a discussion of the distortive influence minimum wage legislation can
have on labor markets, see Balassa, Prices, Incentives and Economic Growth,
120 REv. WORLD ECON. 611 (1984).
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their perceived impact on inequitable socio-economic conditions.
In order to offset the disincentives created by a minimum wage
law, the Mexican government, therefore, might decide to pursue a
second-best solution, such as subsidization of labor or output in
the most severely affected industries."' Subsidizing selected manufacturers would encourage them to increase output and employment, stimulating a more efficient use of resources previously
idled by labor market distortions. 9
Instead of subsidizing domestic production in general, developing countries often conserve their limited financial resources by
subsidizing only exports, while imposing concomitant import
taxes. 20 This combination of measures can provide the same incentives to domestic industry as a more expensive production
subsidy, although import taxes may artificially inflate consumer
prices. 2 ' Thus, governments can sometimes justify the use of export subsidies as well as domestic subsidies, as a means of correcting distortions and compensating for externalities.
An industry generates a positive externality when its expansion
confers unremunerated benefits on other sectors of the economy.
For example, a Brazilian steel mill operating in the Amazon
might provide an external stimulus to neighboring businesses
through its labor training and infrastructure development programs. Although these byproduct benefits aid the local economy,
they do not generate income for the mill, and hence, will not influence its scale of operations. Because the mill's operation generates a net societal gain in excess of its private profit, the mill's
output will be less than the socially optimal level. Government
production subsidies can provide the necessary incentive for the
mill to expand output to the socially optimal level,22 thereby pro18.

Much economic research has been performed analyzing the use of sec-

ond-best solutions to remove economic distortions. A standard treatise in the
field is W.

CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE

(1974). Corden argues

that subsidization is often the optimal means of correcting entrenched labor
market distortions because it imposes the fewest byproduct distortions on the
economy.
19. Id. at 144-49.

20. See B.

BALASSA & Mi SHARPSTON, EXPORT SUBSIDIES BY DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 34-36 (1977).
21. Id.
22. Id. Balassa and Sharpston argue that manufacturing industries in LDCs
provide social benefits by producing skilled labor and technical change, and warrant subsidization as a result. The concept of externalities is more fully ex-
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moting a more efficient allocation of resources.
Proponents of almost any government subsidy can concoct an
externalities argument to justify their position. 23 Economic expansion in a particular sector usually results in increases in both
employment and the demand for inputs, as well as an expansion
of the local tax base. Businesses never can internalize the entire
beneficial impact of increased investment in planning output
levels. At this trivial level, externalities represent a generalized
economic phenomenon unworthy of special government attention.
But in many cases, particularly in underdeveloped nations or regions, the diffuse and positive external consequences of introducing or expanding certain industries provide appropriate grounds
for subsidization. Governments do not always, or even predominantly, employ subsidies as second-best measures to improve efficiency or to compensate for significant externalities; but they do
so often enough to discredit the fair traders' blanket condemnation of subsidization as an affront to free trade and comparative
advantage.
Subsidies designed to correct government imposed economic
dislocations or to compensate for externalities do not unfairly advantage foreign exporters. Instead, such subsidies stimulate economic efficiency abroad and reinforce natural comparative advantages. However, whether a government employs a subsidy to
promote economic efficiency or to achieve equally legitimate noneconomic objectives is of no consequence under the United States
"fair trade" laws. Thus, in the name of fair competition, we condemn all subsidies, including those intended to neutralize distortive policies and correct conditions that handicap foreign
producers.
Even economically unjustifiable subsidies often may provide lit-

plained in A.

FELDMAN, WELFARE EcONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

89-105

(1980).
23. Of course, protectionism can be justified as an attempt to forestall the
negative externalities generated by diminished output in import-competing industries. For example, erecting tariff and quota barriers might enable beleagured
Pennsylvania steel mills to retain market share, preventing the loss of jobs that
unimpeded market forces might otherwise dictate. But protectionism is usually
an inefficient means of offsetting a negative externality such as decreased employment in Johnstown, because of the heavy aggregate costs it imposes on consumers in general. Governments should intercede to offset externalities only
when the aggregate impact of such measures would be to stimulate a more efficient allocation of resources nationally.
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tle net advantage to foreign exporters beset by a panapoly of government-imposed disadvantages. For example, the same European governments which distribute relatively generous politically
motivated subsidies also exact relatively high income and payroll
taxes from their industrial sectors.24 United States trade law
treats subsidies as unfair deviations from an otherwise common,
acceptable, or inconsequential level of government economic intervention. Governments, however, pursue widely varying degrees
of intervention. Countervailing an isolated subsidy cannot level a
competitive plane which has been permanently disfigured by a
myriad of government tax, benefit and regulatory policies.
Thus, the fair trader's vision of a level playing field is an economic mirage. Its attainment presupposes the ability to determine each subsidizing nation's underlying comparative advantage
in particular industries, to be calculated by factoring out the consequences of all government-imposed economic distortions. Even
the most quixotic economist would blanch at such a task. Consider the impact of one individual government policy benefiting
or penalizing a particular product, such as a cigarette tax. The
increase in cigarette prices would influence the price of all other
products to some degree, due to its general equilibrium effect on
the demand for and supply of complementary and substitute
products.25 Every government program has a similar general equilibrium impact that reverberates throughout the economy. Consequently, economists cannot accurately distill from the resulting
mishmash of distortionary effects the net impact of aggregate
government policy on the price of a particular product. Rather
24. See J. Murri, TAXES, SUBSIDIES, AND COMPETITIVENESS INTERNATIONALLY 5
(1982).
25. The term "general equilibrium effect" refers to the impact that an individual tax has on the entire economy over time. By increasing cigarette prices, a
cigarette tax would have an immediate impact on demand for competing substitute goods, such as chewing gum, which would become relatively less expensive.
Similarly, demand for complementary goods, such as lighters, would fall with
demand for cigarettes. The forces of supply and demand will first influence the
prices of these substitute and complementary goods, and next the prices of
goods considered substitutes and complements for chewing gum, lighters and
the like. Like a wave of falling dominoes, changes in supply and demand for one
good will eventually effect the supply and demand for all goods, until the economy digests the entire system-wide impact. Given that at any one time a myriad
of government policies are working at cross-purposes, the net impact of the sum
total of distortive government policies on the price of a particular good can
never be accurately isolated.

19851

U.S. FAIR TRADE POLICY

than continue the economic charade of trying to determine precisely as well as countervail the impact of foreign interventionism,
United States policymakers should reconsider the relevance of
the concept of a level playing field in the modern world.
Subsidies affect industrial incentives only from within a
broader current of government intervention. Thus, trade can confidently be condemned as unfair only in those relatively few cases
where the magnitude of subsidization is immense or the exporter's objective blatantly predatory. Countervailing isolated
subsidies, without regard to offsetting considerations, serve only
protectionist interests, and not the illusory objective of fair trade.

IV.

EVALUATING THE FAmNEss OF DUMPING

The Commerce Department is authorized to assess antidumping duties against imports with a foreign market value in excess
of their United States price.2 6 Although Commerce normally determines foreign market value on the basis of an import's home
market sales price, if home market distribution is too limited,
Commerce will look to third-country sales or rely on a constructed value. During its investigations, Commerce resorts to a
series of complex and often questionable economic calculations in
order to develop a level basis for comparison of foreign market
value and United States price. Although acclaimed as vital to the
preservation of fair competition conditions in United States markets, this elaborate adjudicatory mechanism usually promotes
only protectionist ends.2 s
The following premise appears to underlie the antidumping
code: importers whose home market prices or costs of production
exceed their United States prices must be abusing their foreign
market power to eliminate or cripple unfairly United States competitors. Dumping, however, is ordinarily a perfectly legitimate
response to the varying economic conditions present in different
national markets. 29 Foreign price discrimination is neither ineffi-

26. 19 C.F.R. § 353.48 (1985).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1982).
28. A convincing demonstration of the questionable nature of the techniques
and formulas utilized by the Commerce Department in its antidumping investigations is provided in Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions
of the Tariff Act of 1930, 13 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Caine].
29. See Ordover, Sykes and Willig, UnfairInternationalTrade Practices,15
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cient nor contrary to consumer interests unless an importer

harbors monopolistic intentions. Commerce, however, casts far
too wide a net in conducting its investigations-few of the importers challenged as dumpers actually threaten the competitive
integrity of the United States marketplace.
Fair traders allege that predatory importers employ dumping to
drive out their American competition and create opportunities for
price gouging in the vacated markets. Yet, these same fair traders
provide little or no evidence that such foreign machinations have
ever succeeded. Professors Ordover and Willig have demonstrated
convincingly that only markets characterized by all three of the
following deficiencies will prove susceptible to predatory abuse:
(1) a sufficient degree of horizontal concentration, (2) high and
irreversible costs limiting market entry and (3) barriers to reentry
once competitors abandon the market.30 Although high entry
costs and reentry barriers exist in many markets, few threatened
by subsidized imports are sufficiently concentrated to make predation a plausible objective. Absent the simultaneous presence of
the three enumerated competitive restraints, predatory importers
will be either unable to drive out their competitors or unable to
later raise prices for fear of attracting renewed competition. Indeed, a major barrier to prospective predatory importers in most
markets appears to be other foreign competitors, who are often
free to adjust their volume of imports with relative ease. Given
these obstacles, dumpers only rarely should be regarded as predatory threats.
A foreign producer who charges what each of its markets will
bear, but always above marginal cost, is behaving logically, not
unfairly. Nonpredatory importers would be foolish to waste income gained from home market power by pricing below cost in
the United States, unless coerced by fierce competitive conditions. In most cases, dumping is the innocent, and hardly unfair,
byproduct of an import strategy simply designed to maximize
profits, or minimize losses, in each of the diverse markets in
which an importer competes.
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 323, 328 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Ordover]. These
three economists provide a detailed analysis of the benign impact of nonpredatory dumping. See also L. YEAGER AND D. TUERCK, FOREIGN TRADE AND U.S. POLIcY 128-29 (1976).
30. Ordover and Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:Pricing and
Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981).
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V.

THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE FAIRNESS STANDARD

United States trade policy now revolves around the nebulous
but politically potent concept of fairness. We have established an
enormous adjudicatory network to evaluate the behavior of foreign governments and producers in their home markets. The
Trade Agreement Act eliminated most of the discretionary authority once afforded the Executive Branch when processing
dumping and subsidy complaints. This emphasis on adjudication
enables the President to assuage competing protectionist and foreign interests with the claim that fair trade disputes are now resolved through legal channels beyond his control.
However, the concept of fair trade enshrined in United States
law is economically incoherent and is enforced in a manner that
often appears unfair and arbitrary. Moreover, only minimal proof
of injury is required before countervailing and antidumping duties can be imposed. 1 By penalizing importers on the basis of a
contradictory rationale and an unpredictable methodology, without requiring proof of substantial domestic injury, we simply have
engaged in a covert form of protectionism.
The United States now maintains a large and expensive bureaucracy to enforce its quasi-protectionist "fair trade" laws.
Ironically, import-competing interests have increasingly disregarded existing bureaucratic channels and directly petitioned the
President with their "fair trade" grievances. They thereby hope
to obtain broader relief than mere countervailing or antidumping
duties. Such duties, intended only to offset the alleged price advantage resulting from dumping or subsidization, 32 often are not
sufficiently punitive to affect significantly the volume of imports
entering threatened markets. In frequently bypassing or belittling
the adjudicatory process, protectionist forces have signalled that
their real concern is not the ethics of foreign behavior abroad, but
rather market conditions in the United States.
The same trade laws that supposedly promote the cause of
"fairness" fail to quench the protectionist's underlying thirst for
comprehensive remedial action. However, even after abandoning
adjudication, protectionists still enjoy employing fair trade rheto31.

See Caine, supra note 28, at 703. The ITC need only be satisfied of the

existence or threat of material injury, defined by statute as "harm which is not
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982).
32. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e(a), 1673e(a) (1982).
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ric to bolster support for their ultimate objective-de facto limits
on import penetration of United States markets. In pursuit of
this objective, import-competing interests now utilize a bold array
of tactics. Flooding Congress with more imaginative protectionist
initiatives, they continue to make aggressive use of adjudicatory
channels and constantly pressure the Executive Branch to impose
discretionary trade sanctions. In order to forestall further fragmentation in United States trade policy, a new unifying approach
must replace this confused scramble for trade fairness.
The most efficient way to tackle trade disputes is head on: concentrating ab initio on market share, instead of becoming mired
in misleading and arduous fair trade adjudication which often addresses only the peripheral concerns of interested parties. The
Trade Act of 1974 3 already offers a suitable discretionary mechanism for directly balancing competing trade interests. Section
201, 34 known as the Escape Clause, authorizes the President to
grant import relief when the ITC determines that increased imports of a product are a substantial cause of serious injury to domestic competitors.3 5 Once a complainant satisfies this injury test,
the President has the option of either raising tariffs, imposing
quotas or negotiating orderly marketing agreements." The President may deny relief if it is unlikely to lead to restored domestic
competitiveness or if the cost to consumers is excessive.37
33. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of
5, 19, 26, 31 U.S.C. (1982)).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
35. The ITC must take into account all relevant economic factors in making
its injury determinations, including levels of profitability, employment, sales, capacity utilization and production. Id. § 2251(b)(2). Imports will be regarded as a
substantial cause of serious injury if they are more significant than any other
cause. Id. § 2251(b)(4).
36. Id. § 2253(a). If the ITC makes an affirmative injury determination, it is
authorized to recommend the provision of adjustment assistance, as opposed to
import relief. Id. § 2251(d)(1). If the ITC recommends import relief, the President must determine within 60 days what method and amount of relief he will
provide, or determine that relief is not in the national economic interest. Id. §
2252(b).
37. Id. § 2252(c). This section also authorizes the President to deny relief if

advisable in light of such considerations as United States international economic

interests, the availability of adjustment assistance, or the impact that offsetting
concessions would have on other United States economic sectors. Section 248 of

the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, amending
19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (1982) enables Congress by joint resolution to overturn

presidential decisions which resolve Escape Clause actions in a manner contrary
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Trade policy decisions should be predicated on principled evaluations of economic and equitable considerations, rather than on
fairness rhetoric. Proper application of the Escape Clause would
result in protection only for producers whose combined injuries
and prospects for recovery outweigh the benefits consumers derive from free trade. Eliminating existing fair trade remedies and
relying solely on the Escape Clause would replace disguised protectionism with a more appropriate standard for weighing the issues of greatest importance in trade disputes.38
A. Debating the Merits of the Status Quo
Economists Gary Hufbauer and Joanna Erb support the fairness approach to trade, arguing that a liberal trade order is no
longer feasible in this era of divergent national economic policies.39 Our trading partners have become increasingly mercantilistic; therefore, we must protect our domestic industries from subsidized competition, or risk losing the evolving intergovernmental
struggle for the economic high ground.
Hufbauer and Erb advocate further refinements in the legalistic
guidelines defining the differences between acceptable (generally
available) and unacceptable (industry-specific) foreign government incentive programs. 40 They overlook the economic anomalies resulting from this demarcation process because they fear
that if the world trend towards subsidization continues to intensify, it will culminate in outright trade warfare.
A subsidized trade war would drain government coffers and
generate a crippling protectionist backlash. Facing this chilling
prospect of mutually assured economic destruction, we can anticipate that our trading partners will exercise a reasonable degree of
restraint in their use of subsidies. Besides, replacement of existing antisubsidy laws with a discretionary approach would not
leave United States industries entirely defenseless when conto ITC recommendations. The duration of Escape Clause relief is ordinarily limited to five years in order to encourage adjustment by the injured United States
industries. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h).
38. Prior commentators have similarly argued at length in favor of replacing
adjudication with a modified Escape Clause approach. See Barcelo, Subsidies,
Countervailing Duties and Antidumping after the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 257 (1980); Caine, supra note 28.
39. See G. HUFBAUER AND J. ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1984).
40. Id. at 127.
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fronting subsidized competition. Judicious use of the modified
Escape Clause remedy presumably would deter foreign nations
from engaging in any subsidization which threatens to severely
injure United States interests.
Although Hufbauer and Erbs' fear of a beggar-thy-neighbor
trade war appears exaggerated, any shift in domestic emphasis
away from countervailing action should be accompanied by renewed multilateral initiatives to condemn unbridled subsidization. Historical precedent indicates that, absent repeated encouragement, nations can easily lose sight of the fact that trade
warfare directly contravenes their enlightened self-interest. 41
Moreover, continued international use of export-oriented subsidies at current levels is in itself objectionable. When governments
resort to widespread subsidization, they propagate a worldwide
misallocation of resources, since the majority of subsidies are not
justifiable on efficiency grounds.
With few exceptions, however, unilateral action by the United
States has done little to dissuade subsidizing governments
and,hence, merely deprives United States consumers of windfall
gains. Countervailing action only compounds an already inefficient situation when it is not accompanied by reduced subsidization abroad. Multilateral negotiations offer the best hope for effectively coming to grips with the problem.
Some economists argue that the United States should vigorously enforce its fair trade laws to prevent foreign nations from
using subsidies that create otherwise non-existent comparative
advantages in the so-called "industries of the future. ' '42 Not all
such foreign subsidization programs, however, will succeed. Economic characteristics such as labor scarcity or capital abundance
can stimulate certain industries and disadvantage others. Similarly, government intervention may hinder as many exporters as
it helps. The innovative and entrepreneurial qualities of privately
funded United States competitors will continue to provide a winning edge in many markets.

41. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the United States and its trade
partners engaged in a spree of self-destructive protectionist one-upmanship
which crippled trade relations and further aggravated the worldwide slide into
depression. See P. ELLSWORTH AND J. LEITH, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 43345 (4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as P. ELLSWORTH AND J. LEITH].
42. See A Report to the President From the President's Export Council,
Coping with the Dynamics of World Trade in the 1980s, Vol. II, 171 (1984).
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The United States need not emulate its interventionist rivals to
compete internationally. United States policymakers obviously do
not regard industrial policy as an infallible means of generating
competitive advantages in the major growth industries; otherwise,
they would trumpet its virtues themselves. Our government can
best promote the growth of dynamic private enterprises by concentrating on the removal of impediments to their further expansion. Priority should be given to negotiations aimed at increasing
the access of United States exports to world markets. Stricter enforcement of United States fair trade laws might only stiffen foreign resolve to maintain import barriers, just as United States recourse to industrial policy might only dilute the competitive spirit
fueling our economic expansion.
B. Aspects of Major Trade Reform
Proponents of countervailing duties contend that reliance solely
on the Escape Clause would lead to the increasingly abusive use
of export subsidies abroad. However, the Escape Clause could be
modified to make the existence of egregiously anticompetitive
subsidies an important factor in determining appropriate relief
once complainants satisfy the "substantial cause of serious injury" test. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)43 presently obligates the United States to (1) impose Escape Clause penalties evenly on all importers of an offending
product, and (2) make offsetting concessions available to the
countries involved. When foreign subsidies cause injury, however,
the United States could depart from GATT strictures by selectively penalizing only subsidized importers and without providing
offsetting compensation.
The pertinent provision of GATT, Article XIX, does not expressly forbid signatories from introducing such modifications. 44
Indeed, United States trade law currently permits selective application of Escape Clause remedies when necessary. 45 To the extent
a modified Escape Clause proposal contravened GATT guidelines,
43. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, art. XIX, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited
as GATT]. For a detailed explanation of express and implied United States obligations under Article XIX of GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT 564-66 (1969).
44. GATT, supra note 43, art. XIX.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(k)(1) (1982).
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it would do so only to the extent required to achieve those
broader objectives fully endorsed by GATT. Our trading partners,
therefore, would be unlikely to raise strong objections to such a
proposal.
The domestic industry could utilize the Escape Clause forum
whenever import competition directly and significantly
threatened their economic well-being. In addition, a supplemental
avenue of relief should be maintained to deter importers who otherwise might resort to predatory dumping intended to cartelize or
monopolize United States markets. Recall that dumped or subsidized imports could only effectively achieve the monopolization of
a limited number of competitively restricted United States markets. Instead of relying on the overly broad and often arbitrary
fair trade laws to address this problem, Congress could delegate
responsibility to the federal courts under the antitrust laws. 46
Presumably, the courts could efficiently enforce straightforward
analytic tests to determine if predatory threats exist in particular
cases.' 7 Critics would argue that antitrust judgments often are as
unpredictable and arbitrary as administrative dumping determinations. However, such judgments would at least require some ev46. The Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982), made predatory
dumping of imports a criminal offense and provided for treble damages in private antitrust actions against dumpers. However, the Act required proof of both
predatory intent and systematic United States sales at substantially below actual market value or wholesale prices abroad. Id. The severity of these provisions have relegated the Act to total obscurity. See Note, The Antidumping Act
of 1916: Antitrust and Product ComparabilityCriteriain Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1981).
Moreover, the Robinson-Patman Act, prohibiting domestic price discrimination,
does not apply to the dumping of imports. Id. at 142. However, import-competing interests can bring suit against dumpers under the antimonopoly provisions
of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). For a more complete
analysis, see Caine, supra note 28, at 713-14.
47. See Ordover, supra note 29. The authors explain that judicial analysis of
the threat of foreign predation should entail an evaluation of (1) a market's susceptibility to successful predation, based on the existence of horizontal concentration, entry hurdles, and reentry barriers, and (2) the presence of predatory
profit sacrifice, manifested by action which depends for its profitability upon
attainment of a monopoly position based on the irreversible exit of rivals. The
authors propose a comparison of specified cost floors to facilitate the analysis
required under step two. See id. at 324-26. For similar propositions on judicial
means of evaluating the existence of predatory dumping, see Areeda and Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975).
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idence of predatory intent, whereas antidumping duties often are
assessed on the basis of exogenous forces such as exchange rate
fluctuations and relative inflation rates.48 Although judicial determinations might take longer than administrative antidumping investigations, the prospect of treble damages should ease plaintiffs'
objections about delays.
Replacing fair trade remedies with a modified Escape Clause
would shift the focus of trade sanctions from implicit protectionism to the promotion of adjustment. Escape Clause relief, when
warranted, should be both comprehensive and temporary, primarily directed to restoring an afflicted industry's competitive posture and to easing the dislocation costs that such a process might
engender.
C.

Trade Policy and Economic Efficiency

According to classical comparative advantage theory, nations
should specialize in the production of goods which they can make
either most efficiently or with the least inefficiency relative to
other nations. Allocation of resources in accordance with comparative advantage both maximizes world output and minimizes the
prices charged consumers.4 9 Economists have traditionally
ascribed the source of nations' comparative advantages to their
relative endowments of factors of production such as labor and
capital; consequently, India should be competitive in labor-intensive industries and Australia in land-intensive industries.5 0
The economic logic underpinning comparative advantage and
its byproduct, free trade, has not evaporated merely because of
the increased role of government in the economies of our trading
partners. Instead of fearing foreign government efforts to generate "artificial" comparative advantages, we can regard government itself as an element of comparative advantage. Hence, interventionist France or Holland could be said to have a
comparative advantage in aging heavy industries where government subsidization plays as vital a role as labor or capital market
conditions. Conversely, those same nations might also have a
comparative disadvantage in more dynamic economic sectors
where statism deters innovation and entrepreneurship.
48. See Caine, supra note 28, at 695.
49. See, e.g., P. ELLSWORTH AND J. LEITH, supra note 41, at 44-93; Samuelson,
The Gains from International Trade Once Again, 72 EcoN. J. 820 (1962).
50. See P. ELLSWORTH AND J. LEITH, supra note 41, at 94-106.
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Governments which continually subsidize noncompetitive industries can inflict severe long-run damage on their economies by
propagating an inefficient allocation of domestic resources. But if
a foreign government regards subsidization as politically imperative despite the costs, that nation indeed will be able to sell subsidized commodities at competitive rates. A foreign steel mill operating with a blank check from the state treasury, for example, has
as great an advantage as one with access to cheap labor or nearby
iron ore deposits.
The essence of comparative advantage theory is the efficiency
of allocating world production according to relative competitiveness. To the extent government subsidization channels resources
into inefficient activities, it violates the spirit of comparative advantage. However, to the extent foreign governments are absolutely determined to accept and even foster such inefficient results, the United States simply compounds the inefficiency by
imposing countervailing duties. Generally, the effect of countervailing action is not to induce foreign governments to abandon
subsidization, but only to deny the United States economy a
ready source of low-cost suppliers. Internal political pressures are
the root cause of foreign subsidization, and unilateral United
States action rarely will influence any misallocation of foreign resources that may result. Futile attempts to restore world efficiency penalize United States consumers who would otherwise
benefit from lower prices.
The most efficient solution to this debacle would require world
agreement on the optimality of nondistortive government policies.
Absent such a utopian achievement, the most efficient United
States response would permit consumers to take advantage of
subsidized foreign competition and concentrate on realigning production resources. Of course, the many well-paid American workers facing unemployment and dislocation as a result of subsidized
import competition would denounce such a reformulation of comparative advantage theory. Their unions often argue that unchecked foreign subsidization eventually could lead to the
deindustrialization of America. Yet the more market oriented
United States economy has far outpaced its subsidy-prone European rivals during the recent recovery. 51 The relative absence of
government interventionism in the United States actually may
51. See THE ECONOMIsT, Apr. 6, 1985, at 97-98.
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provide a competitive advantage to our flourishing high-tech and
service industries. By concentrating our resources in these areas,
we can maximize domestic allocative efficiency.
D.

The Burden of Adjustment

Achieving allocative efficiency in the United States would necessitate a good deal of difficult adjustment by those employed in
the aging heavy industries that are hit hardest by subsidized foreign competition. Their resulting distress might seem particularly
unfair because it would not have been induced by free market
forces alone.
Entrepreneurship fuels economic development through a "gale
of creative destruction. '52 Technical progress and internal competitive forces will continue to render obsolete once-potent industries. In these instances we acknowledge that such dislocations
are the inevitable byproduct of dynamic economic growth. Yet we
resist making adjustments in the name of efficiency when subsidized imports provide the stimulus for change.
The political appeal of our quasi-protectionist fair trade laws
can be ascribed to several causes. First, the protected industries
are typically quite large, highly unionized and concentrated in
well identified regions. Such characteristics enable them to marshall impressive political resources. 3 Secondly, these industries
are being injured, not by relatively benign forces such as technical
progress, but by subsidized foreign rivals that are propped up by
mercantilist governments. Hence, proponents of countervailing
duties are able to paint the resulting trade-off between equity and
efficiency in particularly stark terms, rendering politically unpalatable any attempt to challenge fair trade rhetoric and
remedies.
Those favoring major trade reform need to stress that more ef52. J.

SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,

SocIALIsM, AND

DEMOCRACY

84 (2d ed. 1947).

53. Economist George Stigler theorizes that legislators act not in response to
the public interest, but in order to maximize their political popularity by pandering to special interests. Concentrated and unionized industries can efficiently
reward legislators favoring their particular interests by dispensing block votes,
marshalling political resources, and maximizing financial contributions by
preventing free-riding among the ranks. Only when a regulation's burden on society exceeds the information costs of uncovering the situation, will the general
public take action to influence legislators. See G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE
STATE (1975). Fair trade rhetoric provides an effective layer of obfuscation hindering consumers from organizing in defense of their interests.
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ficient trade policies need not entail the complete subjugation of
equitable considerations. When injury to import-competing industries is sufficiently threatening, the proper response to subsidized foreign competition surely may include countervailing action. However, rather than ignore the issue of efficiency and rely
entirely on misdirected fair trade adjudication, we can achieve
more comprehensive and balanced results by utilizing a discretionary Escape Clause approach.
Such an approach would enable a farsighted Administration to
shift its emphasis away from protectionism and toward efficient
adjustment, without ignoring compelling equitable considerations.
For, when politicians deem it necessary to offset the distributional consequences of subsidized competition, the efficient solution will relieve some of the pain involved in adjustment, rather
than stifle such adjustment entirely by imposing trade barriers.
However, past adjustment assistance efforts have often been
maligned as ineffective and misdirected."' Understandably, employees facing the permanent loss of lucrative union-scale positions have scorned adjustment in favor of protectionism. Consumers, swayed both by fairness rhetoric and the apparition of
American deindustrialization in the face of subsidized competition, have yet to demonstrate dissatisfaction with couiitervailing
measures even though they bear the brunt of the efficiency costs
such measures impose. Thus, in order to generate political support for a modified Escape Clause proposal, more efficient and
attractive adjustment assistance programs will also have to be developed and promoted.55
E. Political Considerations Inhibiting Trade Reform
Formidable political hurdles certainly would block the path of
any effort to replace the quasi-protectionist "fair trade" system
54. See R. LAWRENCE, CAN AMERICA CoMPETE 131-33 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as R. LAWRENCE]. Lawrence argues that by compensating only workers who fail
to adjust, United States trade adjustment assistance programs have not created
appropriate incentives for worker training and relocation.
55. Senators Roth, Chafee and Symms have introduced during the current
session of Congress the Trade Expansion Act of 1985, S. 234, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S473 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1985). Title II of the bill proposes
just the type of adjustment assistance reform that might provide a political
counterweight to protectionist initiatives. It would scrap the existing program
and provide eligible individuals with job training vouchers redeemable for train-

ing in a variety of private sector programs.
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with a modified Escape Clause approach. One carrot which might
attract support from import-competing interests is the broadened
scope of relief available under the Escape Clause. The President
would not be limited to offsetting the value of subsidies or dumping margins in fashioning relief. 56 Domestic interests, however, already can take advantage of the existing Escape Clause provisions, in addition to fair trade remedies.
Despite its protectionist bent, current United States trade law
does have certain merits. One advantage of fair trade adjudication
is that domestic interests which fail to establish violations, subsequently find it more difficult to plead their tarnished cases when
seeking discretionary relief from the President. Protectionist interests could well amend a modified Escape Clause proposal to
deflate its injury standard and limit the President's discretion to
deny relief. Enacting a one-sided Escape Clause while eliminating
the check provided by negative fair trade determinations would
put importers "squarely behind the eight ball."
An optimal Escape Clause approach would retain the "substantial cause of serious injury" test, and allow both the ITC and the
President to consider consumer as well as producer interests
before deciding on remedial action. Any legislatively mandated
deviation from this optimal approach that is designed to favor
protectionist interests might make even the existing fair trade
morass appear superior in comparison.
The adjudicatory fair trade approach, despite its many anomalies, offers some degree of refuge to foreign exporters who fear
abject protectionist abuse. Currently, assessable duties are limited
to the value of alleged subsidy and dumping margins, 57 and judicial recourse is available to prevent procedural abuse.58 The Administration often points to the existence of the fair trade bureaucracy in order to counter protectionist pressure for more
comprehensive relief from import competition. 9
As the United States trade deficit rises, so do protectionist sentiments in Congress. A "highfalutin'" Escape Clause proposal
would never survive legislative scrutiny in pristine condition.
Thus, trade reform advocates need weigh carefully the theoretical

56. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S11488 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (letter from
Ambassador Brock).
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appeal of a modified Escape Clause against the practical likelihood of extensive protectionist modifications. Congress cannot be
trusted to deliver an impartial discretionary mechanism until
consumers have developed sufficient political awareness and organizational strength to counteract special interest meddling.o
At present the seriously flawed but relatively tolerable adjudicatory approach appears less harmful than its most likely replacements. Nonetheless, chastened reformers should not mistakenly
regard the existing fair trade framework as offering a safe haven
from more comprehensive protectionist initiatives. When necessary, import-competing interests frequently have succeeded in
circumventing adjudicatory channels and obtaining direct relief
through such devices as "voluntary" quotas."1 Those who scoff at
the possibility of passing a modified Escape Clause proposal free
of crippling protectionist amendments, should equally acknowledge that the adjudicatory process also can be overwhelmed easily
by concerted protectionist political pressure.
In retrospect, less ambitious trade reforms ultimately may provide the most effective means of tempering the protectionist bent
of current United States trade policy. Given the dislocations subsidized imports have caused in vocal sectors of the economy, the
odds are slim that Congress would scrap politically appealing fair
trade rhetoric and remedies in favor of academically sound but
rhetorically bland Escape Clause modifications.
F.

Summarizing the Escape Clause Argument

The Trade Agreements Act altered the antisubsidy and antidumping laws in order to reduce executive discretion and legalize the dispute resolution process. However, the inefficiency and
impracticality of addressing major trade disputes in accordance
with a simplistic and nebulous concept such as fair trade has become increasingly obvious. A modified Escape Clause approach
would be superior because it would enable either the ITC or the
President to directly address the crucial issues involved in most
60. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
61. See R. LAWRENCE, supra note 54, at 128. Lawrence cites the following
four recent cases in which protectionists successfully circumvented existing adjudicatory channels: (1) the voluntary export restraints on Japanese
automobiles, (2) the bilateral export quotas negotiated with foreign steelmakers,
(3) the reintroduction of sugar quotas, and (4) the tightening of the multifiber
agreement governing textile imports.
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import disputes: whether the loss to producers outweighs the
gains for consumers; if so, whether relief would stimulate renewed
competition or merely resuscitate an industrial dinosaur.
Critics claim that reintroducing executive discretion and eliminating judicial oversight would leave trade disputes exposed to
the vagaries of the political arena, creating grave potential for
protectionist abuse. Major subsidy and dumping actions, however,
inevitably generate parallel political struggles for discretionary relief anyway, and eliminating the fair trade smokescreen might
force protectionists to defend their political agenda on a cost-benefit basis. Questionable trade actions argued on the merits before
Escape Clause panels are defeated more easily as protectionist
than similar actions that are cloaked in fair trade rhetoric and
decided on the basis of legal hair-splitting.
Trade disputes are inherently political and best resolved in a
forum which squarely addresses the political issues at stake.
Aside from a total absence of Presidential backbone, the only real
threat of protectionist abuse that would materialize under a modified Escape Clause would entail legislative tinkering with its injury test or its mandated balancing of consumer and producer interests. Such tinkering would appear inevitable, however, given
the broad impact such legislation would have on a large number
of well-financed import-competing interests.
The very qualities that make a modified Escape Clause approach appealing from a free trade vantage point would rouse
overwhelming protectionist opposition in Congress. However, advocacy of such a meritorious, albeit unpopular, proposal at least
may ease the path for more modest trade reform measures.
VI.

ALTERNATIVE REFORM MEASURES

The fair trade bureaucracy conceivably is so entrenched that a
major overhaul of the law is nearly impossible. Even if Congress
declines to dismantle the Trade Agreements Act framework in
favor of a modified Escape Clause, less ambitious steps still can
be taken to remove some of the most blatantly protectionist excesses of our "fair trade" regulations. Although more equitable
"fair trade" laws still would focus on inappropriate issues, they
would do so in a less arbitrary and less unpredictable fashion.
The fairness objective of the antisubsidy law is so elusive because no amount of adjudicatory hair-splitting can ensure that we
penalize only economically and politically unjustifiable subsidies.
Nonetheless, a simple reform could effect a more equitable pro-
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cess without requiring the quixotic reconstruction of level competitive playing fields. Congress could instruct Commerce to focus
only on that class of subsidies which most often lacks political or
economic merit-export subsidies. Countervailing only export-oriented subsidies rather than domestic subsidies would streamline
administrative procedures and eliminate much of the current
statute's protectionist bias. If such a blanket exception proves politically untenable, greater account should be taken, at least, of
offsetting costs and consequences before the countervailing of
particular domestic subsidies.
Because the "bogeyman" of foreign government intervention is
absent in dumping controversies, a more politically persuasive
case can be made for paring down the Commerce Department's
jurisdiction in this area. Ideally, the courts should be empowered
to challenge predatory abuses by dumpers under the antitrust
laws, leaving importers otherwise free to charge the going rate in
each of their diverse markets.2 Absent this reform, any measures
granting importers wider latitude to set prices according to prevailing market conditions would be welcomed.
In dumping cases particularly, foreign exchange rate fluctuations and other variable factors tend to influence unduly Commerce Department calculations and to intensify the unpredictability of fair trade decisions." Commerce should promulgate
standards which enhance the predictability and consistency of its
determinations.
The most economically. indefensible aspect of the entire fair
trade canon is the method used to calculate foreign market value
when home market sales are de minimis in dumping cases." One
means of correcting for the arbitrariness of such dumping calculations would require Congress to offer private rulings to importers
who seek advance knowledge of the possible sanctions they face
5
for fair trade violations.
In reforming the fair trade laws, Congress should emphasize
simplification. The adjudicatory process is already extremely

62.
63.

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See Caine, supra note 28, at 695.

64. Id. at 687.
65. For a good discussion of the desirability of these and other limited reforms of United States antisubsidy and antidumping law, see FirstAnnual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, As It
Should Be: What's Wrong with the Law, 100 F.R.D. 576, 593 (1984).
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complex and each session of Congress seemingly results in an expansion of the scope and detail of the fair trade calculus. For example, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 requires Commerce to
investigate the effect of "upstream subsidies" which might indirectly reduce an exporter's raw material costs.6 As the definition
of countervailable subsidization expands, so does the protectionist
potential of United States trade policy. Any simplifying reforms
which would limit the reach of the fair trade laws or curb the
number of countervailable foreign actions would result in a major
improvement on the present state of affairs.
VII.

CONCLUSION

United States fair trade adjudication has grown increasingly
more complex, encouraging ever greater numbers of lawyers to vie
for a piece of the action. Yet, the end result appears more protectionist than fair, because nearly any instance of foreign government subsidization or price discrimination now can be condemned regardless
of offsetting economic or political
justifications.
Moreover, the arduous, expensive, misleading and often arbitrary process of fair trade adjudication simply fails to address the
central concern of most parties involved in major trade disputes-market share. Shifting to a modified Escape Clause approach would enable policymakers to directly and even-handedly
balance competing producer and consumer interests, unencumbered by a fair trade smokescreen. Of course, the injurious consequences of blatantly abusive foreign export subsidies would not
be ignored in the course of Escape Clause deliberations.
Protectionist forces likely have sufficient influence to subvert
any principled proposal to re-emphasize discretionary relief in
trade policymaking. Although it might be politically imprudent to
attempt a complete dismantling of the fair trade framework, efforts should at least be made to correct some of the grosser inequities of the existing adjudicatory approach.

66. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 613(a), 98 Stat. 2948,
3035.

